Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?  by Fox, Jonathan A.
World Development Vol. 72, pp. 346–361, 2015
0305-750X/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.03.011Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?JONATHAN A. FOX*
American University, Washington, DC, USASummary.— Empirical evidence of tangible impacts of social accountability initiatives is mixed. This meta-analysis reinterprets evalua-
tions through a new lens: the distinction between tactical and strategic approaches to the promotion of citizen voice to contribute to
improved public sector performance. Field experiments study bounded, tactical interventions based on optimistic assumptions about
the power of information alone, both to motivate collective action and to inﬂuence the state. Enabling environments for collective action
combined with bolstered state capacity to respond to citizen voice are more promising. Sandwich strategies can help ‘voice’ and ‘teeth’ to
become mutually empowering, through state–society synergy.
 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Key words — social accountability, transparency, voice, public information access, state–society synergy1. INTRODUCTION 1
Social accountability strategies try to improve institutional
performance by bolstering both citizen engagement and the
public responsiveness of states and corporations. In practice,
the concept includes a wide range of institutional innovations
that both encourage and project voice. Insofar as social
accountability builds citizen power vis-a`-vis the state, it is a
political process – yet it is distinct from political accountability
of elected oﬃcials, where citizen voice is usually delegated to
representatives in between elections. This distinction makes
social accountability an especially relevant approach for socie-
ties in which representative government is weak, unresponsive,
or non-existent. 2
Social accountability (SAcc) is an evolving umbrella cate-
gory that includes: citizen monitoring and oversight of public
and/or private sector performance, user-centered public infor-
mation access/dissemination systems, public complaint and
grievance redress mechanisms, as well as citizen participation
in actual resource allocation decision-making, such as partic-
ipatory budgeting. Yet amidst this diverse array of ongoing
institutional experimentation (at both small and large scale),
analysts are recognizing the diﬀerences between limited tools
for civil society monitoring and voice on the one hand, and
broader public interest advocacy reform initiatives on the
other (e.g., Joshi & Houtzager, 2012).
Social accountability initiatives are multiplying in the
broader global context of the booming transparency and
accountability ﬁeld, which also includes high-proﬁle open gov-
ernment reforms and a proliferation of voluntary multi-stake-
holder initiatives that attempt to set social and environmental
standards, mainly for the private sector. 3 These diverse eﬀorts
are based on the assumption that ‘information is power’ – that
transparency will necessarily leverage accountability. Yet
widely accepted, normatively appealing theories of change,
summed up as “sunshine is the best disinfectant,” turn out
to have uneven empirical foundations (Fox, 2007a). In
response, both practitioners and policy analysts are increas-
ingly posing the “what works” question – and the answer
remains inconclusive. 4 Practice in the SAcc ﬁeld continues
to race ahead of empirical research, and relevant theory lags
even further behind.
The diverse mix of institutional change initiatives that fall
under the rubric of social accountability complicates eﬀorts346to draw broader lessons. Those who seek answers in terms
of one-size-ﬁts-all, easily replicable tools quickly confront
the empirical reality that social accountability processes and
outcomes are very context-dependent (Grandvoinnet, Aslam,
& Raha, 2015; O’Meally, 2013). Calling for an evidence-based
approach is not enough. Rethinking the growing body of evi-
dence can advance the way we understand SAcc, which can
help to inform realistic strategies.
This study reinterprets both the empirical evaluation evi-
dence and the analytical concepts involved in SAcc, in order
to help to address the “what next?” question. First, the paper
identiﬁes limits to the conceptual frameworks usually applied
to SAcc. Second, a meta-analysis assesses the SAcc impact
evaluation literature through new conceptual lenses. This exer-
cise draws primarily on 25 quantitative evaluations, with an
emphasis on ﬁeld experiments that are widely considered to
be inﬂuential in the ﬁeld, based on their uptake by mainstream
practitioners. Third, the study proposes a series of grounded
conceptual propositions to analyze the dynamics of SAcc
strategies, informed by the “state–society synergy” approach
to institutional analysis (Evans, 1996). The article concludes
with an emphasis on pro-accountability coalitions that bridge
the state–society divide.
To preview the main argument, if one unpacks the impact
evaluation evidence, it actually tests two very diﬀerent
approaches under the broad SAcc umbrella: tactical and
strategic. Tactical SAcc approaches are bounded interventions
(also known as tools) and they are limited to “society-side”
eﬀorts to project voice. Their theory of change assumes that
access to information alone will motivate localized collective
action, which will in turn generate suﬃcient power to inﬂuence
public sector performance. Strategic SAcc approaches, in con-
trast, deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling environ-
ments for collective action for accountability, and coordinate
citizen voice initiatives with reforms that bolster public sector
responsiveness. Reinterpreting evaluation evidence through
this new lens, it turns out that the results of tactical
approaches are indeed mixed, whereas the evidence of impacts
of strategic approaches is much more promising. This inter-
pretation points to the relevance of institutional change strate-
gies that promote both “voice” and “teeth” (deﬁned here as theFinal revision accepted: March 22, 2015
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE REALLY SAY? 347state’s institutional capacity to respond to citizen voice). The
concluding proposition for discussion is that ‘sandwich strate-
gies’ of mutually empowering coalitions of pro-accountability
actors in both state and society can trigger the virtuous circles
of mutual empowerment that are needed to break out of “low-
accountability traps.”2. RETHINKING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
SACC
The SAcc ﬁeld has outgrown conventional conceptual
frameworks, and lessons learned from practice should inform
new approaches. This section reviews the limitations of four
widely accepted conceptual frameworks. All four were
imported from other intellectual agendas, rather than devel-
oped with the goal of understanding social accountability.
The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report on pub-
lic service delivery set a global agenda, framing service delivery
performance problems in terms of accountability gaps and
pathways (2003). Conceptually, the report emphasized the
principal-agent framework (P-A) as the most relevant tool
for understanding the relationship between citizen voice and
public sector response. The P-A approach became conven-
tional wisdom in mainstream development thinking, assuming
that citizens are ultimately the principals – regardless of
whether or not they actually live under electorally competitive
regimes (e.g., Griﬃn, Ferranti, & Tolmie, 2010). Yet when the
P-A framework is applied to governance, it implicitly assumes
what it needs to demonstrate – that citizens are indeed ulti-
mately in charge – the “principals.” Moreover, this approach
often makes the assumption that citizens-as-principals have
relatively homogenous interests and goals. The main issue here
is one of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970). The P-A
model originally referred to two-way market relationships,
such as shareholders–managers, managers–employees, or cus-
tomers–service providers. When applied to politics, it origi-
nally focused on clear-cut, formal relationships of delegated
authority. Social scientists then stretched the metaphor, apply-
ing it to more amorphous power relations involving mere
inﬂuence rather than authoritative power, as well as multiple
“principals.” This diluted its parsimony. The model also has
diﬃculty with non-hierarchical oversight relationships, as in
the cases of mutual accountability inherent in partnerships,
checks and balances institutions and informal accountability
relationships – all of which are especially relevant for social
accountability processes.
The 2004 WDR built on the P-A approach to propose
another very inﬂuential metaphor for understanding diﬀerent
sets of power relations between citizens and public service pro-
viders. The “long route” has citizens exercising their
“principal-ness” by delegating authority to political represen-
tatives, who then govern bureaucracies by choosing pol-
icymakers who in turn form compacts to manage front-line
service providers. The “short route,” in contrast, links citizens
directly to service providers, through various oversight and
voice mechanisms (as well as exit options, if available). The
long-short route metaphor did not address the potential con-
tributions of other public “checks and balances” institutions,
such as legislatures, the judicial system, audit institutions,
ombudsman agencies, or public information access reforms.
In addition, the 2004 WDR’s proposed short-route approach
to addressing frontline service providers is also exclusively
local, reﬂecting an assumption that institutional failures are
primarily local, rather than distributed all the way up the gov-
ernance “supply chain.” A decade later, mixed results suggestthat the “short route” may not be so short after all. Indeed,
inﬂuential World Bank researchers recently concluded that
there is no “short route” when the problem is what they call
“government failure” – akin to market failure (Devarajan,
Khemani, & Walton, 2014). They recognize that there is no
way around the central issue of political accountability and
the incentive structures that inﬂuence the degree to which
elected oﬃcials are responsive to citizens.
By the latter part of the decade of the 2000s, oﬃcial World
Bank documents began to promote a third discursive frame
for accountability issues, deploying the market metaphors that
contrast the “supply” and “demand” for good governance.
This reﬂected the World Bank’s own internal organizational
divisions, which separated staﬀ dealing with inward-looking
public sector reforms (the supply side) from those who pro-
moted public interfaces and civil society engagement (the
demand side). In contrast to the 2004 WDR, this approach
does emphasize the potential contribution of checks and bal-
ances-type institutions, which ﬁt under the “supply side”
(anti-corruption bureaus, open budgeting, legislative oversight
capacity-building, grievance redress mechanisms, etc.). Yet the
market metaphor suggests that somehow demand will create
its own supply, or vice versa. The implicit assumption that
an invisible hand would bring them together is unrealistic.
A fourth conceptual framework for understanding account-
ability draws on spatial metaphors. Horizontal accountability
refers to the mutual oversight embedded in the state’s institu-
tions of checks and balances – relatively co-equal relationships
that do not ﬁt easily into principal-agent models (O’Donnell,
1998). Vertical accountability refers to political accountability
relations between citizens and their elected representatives
(Mainwaring & Welna, 2003). This is a crucial concept for
understanding where pro-accountability reformers come from,
as well as whether their power base can help them to pursue
institutional change. Diagonal accountability refers to hybrid
combinations of vertical and horizontal oversight, involving
direct citizen engagement within state institutions (e.g.,
Ackerman, 2004; Goetz & Jenkins, 2001; Isunza Vera, 2006;
Paul, 1992). This can involve either participation in or direct
management of oﬃcial oversight bodies. Some of these oﬃcial
state–society power-sharing bodies are created from above, as
in the case of “invited spaces” (Cornwall & Schattan Coelho,
2007). They can become remarkably participatory, like Bra-
zil’s national policy conferences (Pogrebinschi & Samuels,
2014). Other power-sharing institutions are created in
response to broad-based citizen protest and advocacy, as in
the case of the early days of Mexico’s independent election
administration (Avritzer, 2002; Isunza Vera & Olvera, 2006).
In the context of these spatial metaphors, social account-
ability eﬀorts can be either vertical or diagonal. They are ver-
tical when citizens make demands on the state directly,
whether inside or outside of electoral channels (Peruzzotti &
Smulovitz, 2006). These vertical and diagonal dimensions
interact with each other, since the space for citizen power
within oﬃcial oversight bodies may be created in response to
vertical pressures from below. Conversely, some argue that
where horizontal accountability is weak, the underlying cause
is ﬂaws in the vertical accountability process (Moreno, Crisp,
& Shugart, 2003). Where weak horizontal and vertical
accountability systems reinforce each other, one can speak
of “low accountability traps” (Fox, 2007b). Analysis of these
accountability bottlenecks involves unpacking the state in
terms of its often spatially uneven degree of institutionaliza-
tion and eﬃcacy (O’Donnell, 1993). Moreover, under some
conditions, elected national authorities may have incentives
to allow undemocratic subnational regimes to persist – or they
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Giraudy, 2013). Yet when social accountability eﬀorts do have
impact on the state, it is often through a pathway that involves
triggering or empowering horizontal public oversight institu-
tions to act (Fox, 2007a; Peruzzotti & Smulovitz, 2006).
Each of these four broad conceptual frameworks has their
own strengths and limitations, yet they do not direct us to
the kind of analytical tools that are needed to advance our
capacity to categorize, measure, and compare the dynamics
of the many diﬀerent approaches that fall under the umbrella
category of social accountability. A fresh set of conceptual
propositions is needed, drawn inductively from actual reform
experience, including the distinction between tactical and
strategic approaches, the relationship between voice and teeth,
forward vs. backward-looking accountabilities, “squeezing the
balloon,” vertical integration, and the sandwich strategy.
First, however, a meta-analysis of the impact evaluation evi-
dence is in order.3. REREADING THE SACC EVALUATION EVIDENCE:
WHAT DO MIXED RESULTS MEAN?
How does one draw broader lessons from a body of empiri-
cal evidence that covers very diverse reform eﬀorts, in a wide
range of contexts? The SAcc impact evaluation evidence com-
bines apples and oranges. As a result, it should not be surpris-
ing to ﬁnd that “the evidence is mixed” – but this does raise the
question of how to interpret the ﬁndings. Do speciﬁc cases of
lack of SAcc impact “disprove” the broader concept? Do
speciﬁc cases of positive impact “prove” the broader concept?
This raises the broader question: what would “proof of con-
cept” for SAcc look like?
The notion of “proof of concept” is very relevant for ﬁrst
addressing the “what works?” question – and then for refram-
ing it. Widely used in scientiﬁc, medical, and engineering
ﬁelds, “proof of concept (or principle)” refers to the demon-
stration that a proposed idea functions as predicted. 5 More-
over, the process of testing the possible validity of an idea is
distinct from assessing its generalizability. In other words,
there is a diﬀerence between demonstrating whether a proposi-
tion works at all, and showing that such a proposition holds
across a wide range of conditions. In the case of SAcc, the gen-
eral proposition would be that informed citizen engagement
can improve the public sector’s performance, especially if it
bolsters the functioning of public oversight institutions. Yet
tests of this general proposition under speciﬁc conditions
would only provide hard evidence of whether that particular
version of the idea works under those speciﬁc conditions. 6
For taking stock of the evidence related to SAcc, one of the
most relevant observations from the experience with “proof of
concept” in the biomedical ﬁeld is that the pathway for trans-
lating a promising idea into practical, applied solutions is
often long and diﬃcult. For example, the “theory of change”
behind vaccines originated in 1796. Now – centuries later – no
one doubts the validity of that theory of change, yet vaccines
still only work for certain diseases, to some degree, with prob-
lem-speciﬁc substances and doses that require very extensive
experimentation to discover. The point of this analogy for
assessing institutional change strategies is that even potentially
“high impact” solutions to problems are likely to have only
partial impacts, only under certain conditions, only for certain
problems.
The “proof of concept” idea suggests reframing a common
SAcc question: “does it work?” The problem with this formula-
tion is that it implicitly sets up the answer in dichotomous,yes-or-no terms. 7 It is more relevant to frame questions in
terms of the degree to which – and the conditions under
which – an institutional change initiative would work. In addi-
tion, the criteria for assessing whether a change initiative
“works”may well be contested. Especially in contexts in which
the baseline is a complete absence of public accountability,
even partial and uneven increases in accountability may be
quite signiﬁcant. For example, in the case of Mexico’s regional
Community Food Councils, at most one third of them man-
aged to play their autonomous role of overseeing the perfor-
mance of a large-scale rural food distribution program.
Therefore, the program “failed” two-thirds of the time. Yet
for those millions of low-income rural citizens whose interests
were represented by the more autonomous councils, the pro-
gram certainly did work (Fox, 1992, 2007b). Moreover, the
“does it work?” framing of the question also implies that a
robust general answer can be drawn from what is still a
relatively small impact evaluation literature that focuses
more on measureable information-led pilot interventions than
on large-scale, sustained national citizen voice or oversight
programs. Perhaps most importantly, the “does it work?”
framing of the question also implies that SAcc is expected to
work all by itself, in the absence of other good governance
reforms.
The issue of proof of concept for SAcc is on the develop-
ment policy agenda for very good reason – because a series
of inﬂuential studies have documented cases that have led to
little or no tangible development impact. Development
practitioners are drawing at least three general “takeaways”
from these evaluations:
 First, information is not enough. Speciﬁcally, impact eval-
uations have tested the proposition that local dissemination
of service delivery outcome data will activate collective
action, which will in turn improve service provider respon-
siveness. The studies that ﬁnd no impact from information
dissemination interventions include Banerjee, Banerji,
Duﬂo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2010), Lieberman,
Posner, and Tsai (2014), Keefer and Khemani (2012) and
Ravallion, van de Walle, Dutta, and Murgai (2013), among
others.
 The second general proposition is that bottom-up moni-
toring often lacks bite. Here, an especially inﬂuential impact
evaluation has tested the proposition that local oversight of
public works, by itself, can limit corruption. Olken’s ﬁeld
experiment involving community road-building in
Indonesia’s KDP program found that community monitor-
ing had little impact on reducing corruption (2007).
 Third, a growing body of research ﬁnds that oﬃcial
“community-driven development” programs are often cap-
tured by local elites (e.g., Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Platteau
& Gaspart, 2003). This literature focuses on state-led
(“induced”) participation rather than on SAcc per se, but
both approaches overlap to a degree, insofar as they share
the goal of encouraging the under-represented to exercise
voice in the use of public resources.
These three propositions are quite compelling, so what do
they mean for understanding SAcc? The interpretation of
the empirical evidence of SAcc impacts is complicated by the
fact that some of the most inﬂuential studies of SAcc non-
impact do not actually show what many think they show. It
is instructive to examine three especially iconic studies in terms
of the diﬀerences between how their ﬁndings are widely under-
stood and what they actually show. The choice of these studies
and the interpretation of how their ﬁndings are widely under-
stood were based on 15 interviews with World Bank staﬀ and
consultants, carried out between December 2013 and March
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE REALLY SAY? 3492014. The interviews asked which evaluations they considered
to be the most inﬂuential, both among their colleagues and for
their own thinking about the strengths and limitations of SAcc
approaches.
First, consider Olken’s methodologically elegant compar-
ison of anti-corruption interventions in village public works
in Indonesia (2007). Practitioners often interpret this study
as supporting the more general claim that top-down central
audits work, whereas community monitoring has little impact
on corruption (though the same author later showed that
because local authorities were skilled at hiding their corrup-
tion, the community-based monitoring lacked adequate pro-
ject oversight capacity [Olken, 2009]). To “work” in this case
meant a reduction of one third of the estimated leakage (down
8 percentage points from 24%). Yet the causal mechanism
behind the audits rarely involved oﬃcial penalties. It was
mainly the threat of community responses to the promised
local dissemination of the ﬁndings that gave the audits the
clout to reduce corruption. 8 Moreover, all of the communities
involved in the ﬁeld experiment were already mobilized
through their involvement in KDP, a national participatory
rural development program. 9 As an architect of KDP put it,
while the study itself clearly stressed the community read-outs
of the audit ﬁndings, “for some reason the evaluation commu-
nity at large didn’t want to hear that part.” 10 This study was
subsequently quite inﬂuential in policy terms, leading the
Indonesian government to scale up its application of central
audits to more than 80% of the local development projects
in 70,000 villages. Yet the project’s oﬃcial monitoring data
do not indicate whether the community dissemination of those
audit ﬁndings was also scaled up. 11 In spite of the imbalanced
uptake of its ﬁndings, this study shows that top-down and bot-
tom-up approaches were synergistic rather than dichotomous.
Second, consider Banerjee et al.’s inﬂuential ﬁeld experiment
focusing on village education committees in Uttar Pradesh
(2010). Researchers collaborated with a prominent Indian
education civil society organization to test approaches to the
provision of information about schooling outcomes to parents
and village education committees, in an eﬀort to activate them
to attempt to improve school performance. The CSO con-
vened parent meetings that generated attendance, but no
learning outcomes. Their ﬁndings show that “providing infor-
mation on the status of education and the institutions of par-
ticipation alone is not suﬃcient to encourage beneﬁciary
involvement in public schools” (2010, p. 5). The study also
documents the weaknesses of the oﬃcial channels for commu-
nity participation and oversight. In that state, the Village Edu-
cation Committee is composed of the head teacher, the elected
head of village government, and three parents chosen by local
oﬃcials. They are therefore – by design – not independent
oversight bodies (cf, Barr & Zeitlin, 2011). Moreover, the
study found that a quarter of the parent members speciﬁcally
denied being members, the vast majority of members knew lit-
tle about the VEC, and 92% of villagers were unaware of the
VEC’s existence. Nevertheless, the study recognized that “citi-
zens are unlikely to participate in collective action unless there
is a concrete course of action available” (2010, p. 4). In this
case, that action involved training parents to teach literacy
outside of the public schools. This was the most intensive of
the study’s interventions, and oﬀered a viable option to a
minority of families – showing that the main constraint was
not lack of parent interest in their children’s education. How-
ever, “none of the interventions increased parents’ involve-
ment with the public school system” (2010, p. 21). This
suggests that neither the existing channels for parent partic-
ipation in schools, nor the intervention’s attempt to activatethem, managed to create an eﬀective enabling environment
for independent community oversight of the public schools.
Indeed, the kind of information emphasized in the intervention
focused on child learning outcomes rather than on teacher or
school performance, limiting its actionability. Yet the study’s
title, “Pitfalls of Participatory Programs,” implied that the
oﬃcial school oversight process was indeed participatory, in
spite of the lack of parental collective action to hold the
schools accountable. On balance, these results could be con-
sidered a “false negative” for the “does it work?” question,
insofar as the “it” (participation in oversight) didn’t actually
happen.
Third, Mansuri and Rao’s tour-de-force meta-analysis of
almost 500 studies examines both community-driven develop-
ment and local decentralization to address “the impact of
large-scale, policy-driven eﬀorts to induce participation”
(2013, p. 2). Many within the World Bank concluded that
the study found that participatory local development often
does not work – that it is often captured by elites or leads to
modest development impacts that are often socially biased.
Yet the study explicitly limited its focus to top-down “local
development” projects, and did not address bottom-up, “or-
ganic” participation. Moreover, many large-scale oﬃcial
development programs that ostensibly attempt to induce par-
ticipation or that fund local authorities do not include sub-
stantive measures to promote accountability, either from
above or below. 12 Local capacity to respond to potential
openings from above may be limited – “civil society failure,”
as they put it. It should therefore not surprise analysts of par-
ticipation that such interventions would be vulnerable to elite
capture. The authors conclude that context-sensitive partic-
ipatory eﬀorts that are combined with the use of central
authority to improve state responsiveness – and therefore
accountability – are indeed quite promising. The study’s con-
clusions are therefore very consistent with an emphasis on
social accountability.
This exercise of re-reading three iconic impact evaluations
helps to inform a more nuanced approach to diﬀerent kinds
of social accountability eﬀorts. Many of the SAcc interven-
tions that have produced meager results are based on key
assumptions that turn out to be weak, such as “information
is power, “decentralization brings the government closer to
the people,” and “community participation is democratic”
and “community voice can (by itself) inﬂuence public service
providers.” Field evidence indicates that these propositions
need to be further speciﬁed:
 First, what kind of information can empower the poor?
Information needs to be perceived as actionable. 13 For
citizens to be able to act on this information, an enabling
environment needs to reduce fear of reprisals. 14
Incentives for information-led action increase with the
likelihood that the state will actually respond to voice.
 Second, what kind of decentralization can bring the gov-
ernment closer to the people?
Only those local governments that are pushed to be more
democratic are likely to become more responsive when
bolstered by the increased funding and authority that
comes with decentralization. 15
 Third, what kind of community participation is likely to
represent the socially excluded?
Enabling environments to actively encourage the voice
and representation of those who would normally be
excluded because of gender, ethnic, or class bias are
necessary.
 Fourth, what kind of community oversight can address
state failure?
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by themselves, are likely to be either ignored or squelched.
Under what conditions can voice change the balance of
power? Citizen action that has the backing of allies within
the state who are both willing and able to get involved, or
that has forged links with other citizen counterparts to
build countervailing power, has a much greater chance
of addressing impunity.
In brief, exclusively localized, information-led “demand-
side” interventions – what can be called tactical approaches –
tend to be based on unrealistic assumptions. In contrast, what
can be called strategic approaches to SAcc combine informa-
tion access with enabling environments for collective action
that can scale up and coordinate with reforms of the state that
encourage actual public sector responsiveness to voice.
The relevance of this distinction between tactical and strate-
gic approaches to SAcc becomes clearer when one turns to the
body of evidence that ﬁnds tangible positive development
impacts. Table 1 synthesizes the ﬁndings from a wide range
of countries and sectors. In terms of issue areas, this evidence
of tangible development impacts clusters in the areas of educa-
tion, participatory budgeting, and water management, in coun-
tries with at least nominally responsive elected governments.
This snapshot of the evidence does not claim to be complete,
and it is limited to quantitative studies, with an emphasis on
ﬁeld experiments. While space does not permit detailed analysis
of this body of evidence, broader patterns of interaction
between citizen voice and state response do emerge.
(a) Unpacking studies with evidence of SAcc impact
Drawing on Table 1, it is useful to illustrate several cases of
how social accountability processes can lead to tangibleTable 1. Social accountability evidence: positive
Sector Country Tool
Education* Uganda Dissemination of funding info Less
Education+ Uganda Participatory monitoring Edu
Education+ Kenya Community hiring of teachers Teac
outc
Education+ India Dissemination of funding
info & parent roles
Teac
outc
Education+ Indonesia School co-governance Edu
Local government* Brazil Participatory budgeting Low
Local government* Mexico Participatory budgeting Incr
Local government* India Participatory budgeting Imp
Health+ Uganda Participatory monitoring Imp
Local elections+,* Brazil Dissemination of audit info Elec
Public works* India Social audits Less
Public works* Indonesia Dissemination of audits locally Less
Water* Int’l Co-governance Econ
impa
Water* India,
Sri Lanka
Co-governance Econ
impa
Targeted food subsidy+,* India Access to info Acce
* Large-scale policy or program.
+Field experiment.development impacts by spelling out their respective causal
chains (Joshi, 2014). Note that the degree to which each case
is “fully” strategic varies, and together they certainly do not
constitute “proof” of speciﬁc generalizations that would hold
up across diverse contexts. But the combination of the breadth
and depth of this evidence supports the hypothesis that strate-
gic approaches are more promising than tactical approaches
for leading to tangible development impacts.
(i) Uganda education spending information campaign
Perhaps the single most inﬂuential study that demon-
strates tangible positive impacts of “information for
accountability” interventions is Reinikka and Svensson’s
analysis of the public dissemination of school-level funding
information in Uganda (2004). Public spending tracking sur-
veys had shown systematic, high rates of leakage, undermin-
ing eﬀorts to invest more in education. An information
campaign then tried to increase parental awareness of block
grants for schools. The statistical analysis demonstrated a
clear correlation between a school’s distance to newspaper
distribution and the fraction of school block grants that
reached the school, sharply reducing the share of funds
diverted. This experience was inﬂuential in informing the
2004 World Development Report’s “short route” to more
accountable service provision. Yet two key elements were
not spelled out in the causal chain. First, the study assumed
the role of participation rather than documenting or
explaining it. 16 Second, subsequent analysis added the con-
textual “supply side” dimension to the explanation for the
reduced share of funding diverted. The government was
simultaneously prioritizing sharp increases in school enroll-
ments and spending – which also got parents’ attention
(Hubbard, 2007, p. 3).development impacts (large N studies only)
Impact Key sources
leakage Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2011)
cation outcomes Barr, Mugisha, Serneels, and Zeitlin
(2012)
her eﬀort & educational
omes
Duﬂo, Dupas, and Kremer (2012)
her eﬀort & educational
omes
Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman
(2008)
cation outcomes Pradhan et al. (2011)
er infant mortality Gonc¸alves (2014), Touchton and
Wampler (2014)
eased basic service coverage Dı´az-Cayeros, Magaloni, and
Ruiz-Euler (2014)
roved targeting Besley, Pande, and Rao (2005),
Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri (2007)
roved health outcomes Bjo¨rkman and Svensson (2009),
Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, de Walque,
Svensson (2014)
toral accountability Ferraz and Finan (2008)
wage theft Shankar (2010)
leakage of road funds Olken (2007)
omic, social & sustainability
cts
Narayan (1995)
omic, social, & sustainability
cts
Krishna and Uphoﬀ (2002), Uphoﬀ
and Wijayaratna (2000), Isham and
Kahkonen (2002)
ss to ration cards without bribes Peisakhin and Pinto (2010)
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A second example of the causal pathway through which
SAcc can promote tangible development impacts is based on
two decades of large-scale, nation-wide institutional practice
(rather than on a ﬁeld experiment). Numerous municipalities
in Brazil have been practicing participatory budgeting (PB)
for extended periods, beginning more than two decades ago
(169 of 5,561 as of 2000, with 27% of the population). 17
Independently, two nationwide studies compared social indi-
cators in Brazilian municipalities with and without this elabo-
rate process of direct citizen input into municipal resource
allocation decision-making (Gonc¸alves, 2014, Touchton &
Wampler, 2014). Municipalities with PB allocated a larger
share of funding to sanitation and health services, reducing
infant mortality rates (holding per capita budgets constant).
While Brazil’s PB processes vary widely in practice, on balance
their positive impacts are clear. The studies ﬁnd that PB
encourages authorities to provide services that meet needs of
otherwise underrepresented citizens, and the deliberative pro-
cess also creates frequent citizen checks on promised actions
by municipal governments. This research also underscores
the long time horizon and iterative pathways involved in
reaching tangible development impacts.
(iii) Uganda community-based health clinic monitoring plus
deliberative local compact
Bjo¨rkman and Svensson’s very inﬂuential ﬁeld experiment in
Uganda worked with civil society organizations to promote
local compacts between communities and health workers in
dozens of Ugandan villages. After extensive piloting, they
tested a community monitoring process designed to encourage
voice, to avoid elite capture and to facilitate periodic dialog
with health workers (“interface meetings”). The impacts in
treatment communities were dramatic, including reduction in
infant mortality (33%), increased use of outpatient services
(20%) and overall improvement of health treatment practices
(immunization rates, waiting time, absenteeism). This was
made possible by voice, expressed through inclusionary com-
munity discussion and assessment of service performance, bol-
stered by interlocutors who facilitated direct negotiation of
expected actions with the service providers, informed by mak-
ing public the contrast between health worker and community
perceptions of performance. Social rewards and sanctions
appeared to be key incentives, though the study did not
address how they shaped health provider responsiveness.
Years after this ﬁrst study, a follow-up comparison of eﬀorts
to encourage beneﬁciary control with and without access to
information about staﬀ behavior, conﬁrmed that such infor-
mation was indeed crucial to enable stakeholder action to
improve services (Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, Walque, & Svensson,
2014). This case indicates that not all ostensibly voice-led
report cards are the same. For example, in contrast to the edu-
cation intervention in Banerjee et al. (2010) discussed above,
this experiment involved a primary focus on service provider
performance, as well as both explicit, negotiated “community
contracts” that speciﬁed how services were to be improved
and apparently meaningful elected community representation
in the subsequent oversight process. Indeed, “more than one
third of the [previously ineﬀective] local oversight committees
were dissolved and new members elected following the inter-
vention” (Bjo¨rkman & Svensson, 2009, p. 747).
(iv) India’s right to information law, applied to social programs
In spite of the widespread optimism regarding the spread of
public information access laws, few studies document how
they can bolster access to public services. Peisakhin andPinto (2010) tested India’s Right to Information Act with a
ﬁeld experiment that compared diﬀerent strategies for low-in-
come citizens to apply for food ration cards. Bureaucrats
ignored most applicants, but those who also ﬁled oﬃcial infor-
mation requests about both the status of their application and
district-level processing times were consistently successful.
Only bribery produced comparable results. To understand
the causal mechanism would have required a diﬀerent method,
however. With institutional ethnography, researchers could
enter the black box of frontline agencies to analyze the deter-
minants of the behavior of public sector workers (e.g., Lipsky,
1980; Long, 1984). In this case, the study hypothesizes that
mid-level bureaucrats fear that non-compliance with the infor-
mation access law may slow their professional advancement.
India’s RTI law is also unusual in that non-compliant
administrators are potentially subject to nominal ﬁnes.
(v) Community-driven development and village public works in
Indonesia
First known as KDP, then PNPM, this nation-wide rural
community development program followed a strategy that cre-
ated enabling environments for community-level participatory
budgeting and oversight, mainly for local public works and
later for health and education programs. The program led to
increased consumption and access to health care in poor
households and reduced poverty in all the sub-districts where
it operated, especially in the poorest and most remote
communities – though members of marginalized groups did
not beneﬁt as much as others (PNPM, 2012). The program
involved relatively low levels of corruption, especially com-
pared to other state programs, and the causal factors include
local transparency, informed participation, local trainers, cen-
tral audits and extensive monitoring and evaluation
(Friedman, 2013; Guggenheim, 2006). Levels of community
participation were high, including women, though spillovers
to improved access to information and governance involving
other programs were low (PNPM, 2012).
(vi) Social audit hearings in India
The incorporation of community public oversight hearings
into India’s national rural right-to-employment law is one of
the most signiﬁcant examples of a grassroots SAcc initiative
that inﬂuenced national policy. Because of India’s federal sys-
tem, states exercise a high degree of autonomy in their inter-
pretation and implementation of this law. In the state of
Rajasthan, for example – the home of the grassroots social
audit – local politicians blocked state government eﬀorts to
implement the law (Pande, 2014). Andhra Pradesh became
the only state that committed itself to institutionalize the
social audit strategy, bypassing local government and politi-
cians, using a relatively disciplined bureaucracy to create the
enabling local environment needed to have widespread,
repeated public hearings to oversee the rural employment pro-
gram (Aiyar & Mehta, 2015; Maiorano, 2014). This process
led to improved performance of the rural employment pro-
gram, compared to states where the social audit process was
captured or not implemented (Shankar, 2010).4. DISENTANGLING TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC
APPROACHES
To sum up, this exercise of reinterpreting the empirical evi-
dence of both strong and weak SAcc impacts indicates that the
wide range of change eﬀorts that are pursued under the SAcc
umbrella are not all pursuing the same theory of change.
Table 2. Tactical and strategic approaches to social accountability
Tactical SAcc approaches involve:
 Bounded interventions
 Citizen voice as the sole driver
 Assumption that information provision alone will inspire collective
action with suﬃcient power to inﬂuence public sector performance
 Exclusive focus on local arenas
Strategic SAcc approaches involve:
 Multiple, coordinated tactics
 Enabling environments for collective action, to reduce perceived
risk
 Citizen voice coordinated with governmental reforms that bolster
public sector responsiveness (voice plus teeth)
 Scaling up (vertically) and across (horizontally)
 Iterative, contested and therefore uneven processes
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propositions that inform SAcc into two quite distinct cate-
gories: tactical and strategic (see Table 2). These two terms
warrant explicit deﬁnitions. At the most general level, strate-
gies link coordinated actions to goals, with a macro view of
the overall process, whereas tactics refer to speciﬁc micro-level
actions. “Strategic” is deﬁned in this context as an approach
with a theory of change that takes into account the relation-
ship between pro-change actions and eventual goals by spec-
ifying the multiple links in the causal chain. A “tactical”
approach is limited to a speciﬁc link in the causal chain. 18
The argument here is that a tactical approach to SAcc,
which emphasizes local-level dissemination of information
on service delivery outcomes and resource allocation to
under-represented stakeholders – an exclusively “demand-
side” intervention – is based on two unrealistic propositions.
The ﬁrst assumption is that people who have been denied voice
and lack power will necessarily perceive vocal participation as
having more beneﬁts than costs (if the costs are recognized at
all). The second assumption is that even if locally bounded
voices do call for accountability, their collective action will
have suﬃcient clout to inﬂuence public sector performance –
in the absence of external allies with both perceived and actual
leverage.
Strategic approaches to SAcc, in contrast, focus on dissemi-
nating information that is clearly perceived by users as action-
able, in coordination with measures that actively enable
collective action, inﬂuence service provider incentives and/or
share power over resource allocation. This proposition also
suggests that SAcc strategies that manage to scale up voice
and collective action beyond the local arena, while bolstering
the capacity of the state to respond to voice (i.e., teeth) are
more promising.
This tactical–strategic distinction has major implications for
how one assesses evidence. Localized, voice-only, tactical
interventions test extremely weak versions of SAcc. In treat-
ment and control terms, this could be considered ‘under-
dosage.’ To recall the earlier analogy, if a small dose, or an
insuﬃcient number of doses of a vaccine fails to prevent a dis-
ease, that does not rule out the possibility that larger or more
numerous doses could be more eﬀective. Critical mass is
needed, and this may require signiﬁcant lead time (as in Bra-
zil’s diverse participatory budgeting experiences). The path-
way to impact may also be quite discontinuous, perhaps
following a J-curve (Woolcock, 2013). Moreover, informa-
tion-led, voice-only approaches tend to focus on the symptoms
rather than the underlying causes of state failure (e.g., systemicteacher or nurse absenteeism). Insofar as the prospects for
SAcc strategies to transform state–society interfaces depend
on bolstering the state’s capacity to respond to voice, voice
needs to ﬁnd synergy with other governance reform strategies
– such as bolstering the autonomy and capacity of oversight
agencies, as well as the access to the rule of law more
generally. 195. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROPOSITIONS FOR
DISCUSSION
The tactical/strategic distinction is not the only analytical
proposition that can help to shed light on both the opportuni-
ties and obstacles for bolstering SAcc impact. So far,
mainstream development thinking about how to close
accountability gaps has taken a deductive approach, import-
ing concepts like “principal-agent” theory that were not
designed to address SAcc’s checks and balances and mutual
accountabilities. A more inductive approach to concept devel-
opment may be more appropriate to inform future research
into the causal dynamics that drive SAcc impacts. To provide
context for the tactical/strategic distinction, here follow a ser-
ies of additional analytical and conceptual propositions for
debate and elaboration, initially developed inductively from
both top-down and bottom-up SAcc eﬀorts in Mexico over
more than two decades (Fox, 2007b).
(a) Information needs to be user-centered to empower
The tactical approach to SAcc interventions tends to assume
that external actors can predict what kinds of data are going to
be most relevant to spark and guide collective action. It would
be more useful to draw on the concept of “targeted trans-
parency,” which focuses speciﬁcally on accessible information
that is perceived as useful and actionable by stakeholders, and
can be integrated into their routines (Fung, Graham, & Weil,
2007). In this view, information disclosure informs action by
changing actors’ perceptions, mediated by a political economy
analysis of the diﬀerent interests involved. In other words, it is
unrealistic to assume that information that is not linked to
credible pathways to change will overcome well-known obsta-
cles to collective action. In other words, targeted transparency
helps to identify when information can redistribute power.
This user-centered emphasis on actionable information con-
trasts sharply with widespread optimism that larger quantities
of publicly accessible data will necessarily promote good gov-
ernance.
(b) Voice needs representation as well as aggregation
The SAcc literature tends to refer to voice without deﬁning
it. In practice, voice can have many diﬀerent modalities, rang-
ing from weak to strong, from small to large-scale, from
socially biased to more inclusionary. Some policymakers
may consider local-level “beneﬁciary satisfaction” surveys –
the aggregation of individual responses to questions deter-
mined from above- to “count” as citizen engagement. Public
interest groups, in contrast, would tend to understand voice
in more collective, scaled-up terms. Widespread experi-
mentation with social media has made the “scaling up”
of voice easier in often-inhospitable contexts. Yet while
ICT-enabled voice can certainly play an agenda-setting role,
crowd-sourced voices have limited capacity to negotiate with
authority about what to do about those new agendas. If and
when the political space created by voice makes it possible
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going to sit there to negotiate on behalf of those whose voices
are trying to be heard? How can the scaling up of voice transi-
tion from aggregation to representation? 20 This process
involves not only large numbers of people speaking at once,
but the consolidation of organizations that can eﬀectively scale
up deliberation and representation as well – most notably,
internally democratic mass membership organizations. 21
This raises the issue of how to address the challenge of
what Mansuri and Rao call “civil society failure” (2013) –
social contexts with limited capacity for autonomous, pro-ac-
countability collective action. Where traditions of scaled-up
self-organization are weak, freedom of association is limited,
or cultural and linguistic diﬀerences complicate the projection
of voice, the role of interlocutors becomes central (Tembo,
2013). Interlocutors are facilitators of two-way communica-
tion, and their role is often crucial for bridging cultural and
power gaps. In contrast to tactical approaches that assume
that information will by itself motivate action among sub-
ordinated people, strategies that emphasize interlocutors
recognize that for the voiceless to exercise voice eﬀectively
requires support – as well as cross-cultural translation and
bridge-building. The proposition here is that in a SAcc con-
text, voice is most usefully understood as involving both the
aggregation and the representation of the views of other-
wise-excluded citizens.
(c) Recognize that voice can be constrained by the “fear factor”
Tactical, information-led interventions tend to be based on
the implicit assumption that participation has more beneﬁts
than costs – and that the people who are expected to partici-
pate also perceive the beneﬁts as being greater than the costs.
These assumptions tend to ignore well-founded fears of
reprisals. 22 External allies can reduce the risks inherent in
challenging impunity from below, as well as help to identify
actionable pathways through which collective action can lever-
age responses from power-holders. That is the substantive
meaning behind the technocratic-sounding term “enabling
environment.”
The fear factor is why anonymity can be crucial for enabling
voice. To take a larger scale example – India’s widely hailed
right-to-know law – violent reprisals against information-re-
questors have been signiﬁcant. The Indian media reports the
assassination of at least 50 information-requestors, as well as
threats and injuries to hundreds more (Pande, 2015). There
are signiﬁcant opportunities for synergy between SAcc and
legal empowerment here, with the latter ﬁeld’s focus on alter-
native legal defense approaches, such as community parale-
gals, in contexts where the rule of law is weak (Gauri, 2013;
Gauri & Brinks, 2008; Maru, 2010). Indeed, until the fear fac-
tor is addressed and grievance mechanisms have more capacity
to provide meaningful redress, many SAcc initiatives will fall
short of a rights-based approach.
(d) Unpack accountability goals in terms of reactive vs.
preventative approaches
One of the foundational questions in the emerging ﬁeld of
accountability studies involves the two core elements of the
term’s deﬁnition – answerability and sanctions (Schedler,
1999). Is “answerability” enough to “count” as accountability,
or does the concept necessarily require the inclusion of the
capacity to sanction as well (Fox, 2007a)? Looking forward,
it would be useful for analysts to address how the relative
weight given to sanctions may vary across diﬀerent account-ability eﬀorts. The strategies that prioritize responding to past
problems are often distinct from approaches that emphasize
preventing future abuses. This is the classic challenge that
faces promoters of “transitional justice” around the world,
as they attempt to build democratic institutions following
authoritarian regimes. The political dynamics of the possible
tradeoﬀs between forward and backward-looking accountabil-
ity eﬀorts are rarely explicitly addressed in the research litera-
ture on social accountability. Yet frontline accountability
campaigners, operating in institutional contexts that combine
high risk with little means of recourse or redress, are likely to
be quite strategic about investing their limited political capital
primarily in forward-looking, preventative approaches.
(e) “Teeth” for public accountability refers to the state’s
capacity to respond to citizen voice – a process that includes both
negative sanctions and proactive reforms
These two dimensions of “teeth” draw directly from the pre-
vious distinction between reactive and proactive approaches.
This use of the metaphor is not as broad as state capacity in
general, nor is it limited to capacity to sanction abuse or inef-
ﬁciency. State capacity refers to a very broad range of activi-
ties, whereas this focus is speciﬁcally on capacity for public
accountability and responsiveness. The use of the “teeth”
metaphor here is therefore not quite the same as its intuitive
understanding. For example, the notion of “teeth” is also
associated with pressure from below, generated by protest.
For the purposes of this discussion, protest can be framed as
an especially vigorous form of voice. The idea of teeth is cer-
tainly intuitively associated with state capacity to apply nega-
tive sanctions (legal or administrative), as in the case of
investigating, verifying and responding to citizen complaints
and grievances. Indeed, the capacity to sanction is central to
many deﬁnitions of accountability. The use of the metaphor
here goes further, since the idea of capacity for accountability
here goes beyond reactive, punitive approaches to include
proactive responses to public accountability demands. State
capacity for positive institutional responses can take a more
preventative approach by addressing underlying causes of
accountability problems, in contrast to an exclusive focus on
symptoms (as in the case of sanctions). Such capacities would
include changing public sector incentive structures to discour-
age abusive or wasteful behavior, deploying preventative mea-
sures to reduce opportunities for corruption or abuse – such as
open government reforms and citizen oversight – or bolstering
state capacity to follow citizen recommendations that emerge
from participatory budgeting. The reason for including both
positive incentives and negative sanctions in this deﬁnition
of teeth is that they often need to be deployed together in order
to have maximum impact (hence the term ‘carrots and sticks’).
To summarize, the proposition here is that for the purposes of
analyzing SAcc, teeth refers to state capacity to respond to
voice.
(f) Bring vertical accountability back in
The proposition here is that accountability strategies need to
address mutually reinforcing linkages between non-account-
able politicians and bureaucrats. According to the 2004World
Development Report’s conceptual framework, the long and
short routes to accountability are separate. Yet in practice,
both public sector managers and frontline service providers
are rarely insulated from electoral politics. 23 Indeed, in many
contexts the politicized delivery of public services is widely
used as a tool of electoral control (e.g., Fox, 2007b, 2012).
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leaders who are motivated to restrain the same public over-
sight agencies whose actions are crucial to give teeth to SAcc
initiatives (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, grievance redress
mechanisms). In addition, the combination of partisan manip-
ulation of access to social programs with the politicization of
horizontal oversight agencies can undermine fair elections,
which leads to vicious circles of self-reproducing “low-ac-
countability traps” at both national and subnational levels.
This problem suggests the need to complement the vast
“transitions to democracy” research of the 1980s and 1990s
with new analytical frameworks that can account for the
inherently uneven and contested processes of “transitions to
accountability” within regimes that are widely considered to
be at least formally democratic (Fox, 2007b).
Reviewing the SAcc evaluation evidence a decade after the
2004 WDR, the short route to accountability has turned out
to be much more indirect than initially postulated, and its suc-
cess may depend on making the long route more responsive as
well. For example, Bangalore’s famed Citizen Report Cards
had their most signiﬁcant impact on public sector performance
only after a responsive Chief Minister was elected (Paul, 2006)
– thereby ﬁnding synergy between voice and teeth. This issue
underscores one of the missing links in the discussion of the
“short route” to accountability – it often needs the “long
route” of responsive elected authorities to work. The proposi-
tion here is to identify obstacles to SAcc by recognizing the
interdependence of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal account-
ability relationships, since blockages in one arena can spill
over to the other. Unless the mutually reinforcing linkages
between non-accountable politicians and bureaucrats can be
broken, however, their resistance to SAcc eﬀorts will likelyFigure 1. Diverse pathways outsucceed. Conversely, not only is attention to vertical account-
ability crucial for addressing the obstacles to other kinds of
accountability, citizens’ capacity to exercise power over elected
oﬃcials – whether through the ballot or protest – is also essen-
tial for explaining why policymakers might choose to invest
their political capital in promoting pro-accountability reforms
in the ﬁrst place.
(g) Voice and teeth need each other
Once the shorthand concepts of voice and teeth have been
deﬁned, the next step to address the dynamic processes
through which they interact. How do these two diﬀerent
approaches to deploying power to shift accountability
relationships reinforce each other, in order to break out of
low accountability traps? This question suggests identifying
causal pathways. Though they will always be context-depen-
dent, one could argue that such pathways will vary in terms
of whether they are either more voice-led or more teeth-led –
as illustrated in Figure 1.
(h) SAcc strategies need to address the ‘squeezing the balloon’
problem
The targets of citizen oversight may well adapt by recon-
ﬁguring their corruption or diverting advocacy attention to
other agencies or levels of the state. The corrupt are ﬂexible,
so their corruption can be fungible. For example, in some
large-scale community oversight programs, like India’s social
audits or Indonesia’s KDP, it appears that corrupt oﬃcials
respond by inventing new and less visible ways to divert funds,
shifting from wage theft to manipulation of materials billingof low accountability traps.
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large-scale national social accountability programs do much
to project voice but little to bolster teeth, in the form of oﬃcial
willingness and capacity to sanction corrupt oﬃcials from
above. Moreover, if citizen oversight eﬀorts only address local,
front-line service providers, this leaves out the rest of the “sup-
ply chain” of governance. Program monitoring that is partial
or exclusively local in scope may well manage to change the
shape of the “corruption market,” but not necessarily its size
(the amount of leakage – see Zimmerman, 2014).
(i) As a result, civil society policy monitoring and advocacy
needs vertical integration
The premise here is that corruption and social exclusion are
produced by vertically integrated power structures. Insofar as
multiple links in the chain of governance facilitate the deﬂec-
tion of civil society oversight and advocacy, eﬀective responses
require parallel processes that are also vertically integrated. 24
Vertical integration of local, regional, and national civil
society oversight can begin to mitigate the “squeezing the bal-
loon” problem. Yet there are often missing links between local
community voice and national citizen policy/oversight. Given
the often well-coordinated coalitions between anti-account-
ability actors across scale, vertically integrated civil societyFigure 2. The sandwich strategy: opening fromonitoring and advocacy is likely to be only as strong as
the weakest link in its chain. Clearly, this is a tall order,
though examples may be more numerous than the literature
on development policy and service delivery suggests. In prac-
tice, CSOs around the world have extensive track records with
vertically integrated/horizontally broad oversight and advo-
cacy strategies – in the ﬁeld of election monitoring, for exam-
ple. Overall, institutional analysis of the density and dynamics
of the local-national linkages that ground civil society advo-
cacy campaigns in the global South has lagged. Indeed, after
two decades of extensive research that highlights local–global
civil society relationships, scholars are still in the relatively
early stages of “bringing the national back in.” 25
(j) Sandwich strategies can shift power with state–society
synergy
This proposition is grounded in the “state–society synergy”
conceptual framework for understanding institutional change
(Evans, 1996). 26 This process of mutual empowerment across
the state–society divide is also called “co-production” or “co-
governance” (Ackerman, 2004; Ostrom, 1996). The speciﬁc
theory of change here is that the construction of accountability
is driven by coalitions of pro-accountability forces that bridge
the state–society divide – acting to oﬀset anti-accountabilitym above meets mobilization from below.
356 WORLD DEVELOPMENTforces that are also often linked across the state–society divide.
The term “sandwich strategy” is shorthand for these coordi-
nated coalitions among pro-accountability actors embedded
in both state and society (Fox, 1992). 27
The sandwich strategy’s point of departure is that anti-ac-
countability forces, deeply embedded in both state and society,
are often stronger than pro-accountability forces. To break
these “low-accountability traps,” resistance is likely and there-
fore conﬂict would be both expected and necessary – as indi-
cated in Figure 2. While initial opportunities for change are
necessarily context-driven and can be opened either from
society or from the state, the main determinant of a subsequent
pro-accountability power shift is whether or not pro-change
actors in one domain can empower the others – thereby trigger-
ing a virtuous circle (e.g., Fox, 1996). In this scenario of mutual
empowerment – as illustrated in Figure 2 – reformists within
the state need to have actual capacity to deliver to their societal
counterparts, by providing tangible support and the political
space necessary to provide some degree of protection from
the likely reprisals from vested interests.
This process of openings from above led by reform cham-
pions that meet collective action from below represents one
only of many possible strategic approaches to pro-account-
ability change, using the term in the sense described above.
Many other kinds of accountability campaigns are led primar-
ily by pressure from below, which may or may not ﬁnd and
empower counterparts within the state.
(k) Because context matters, the subnational comparative
method is necessary to capture variation
The comparative method has a great deal to oﬀer the “what
works, and why” research agenda, but it has been persistently
crowded out by the dominant qualitative–quantitative debate.
In the emerging ﬁeld of accountability studies, few analysts
recognize that the comparative method is a broad logic of
inquiry within which quantitative and qualitative approaches
are both sets of tools whose relevance and relative strengths
depend on the question. Among those who do use the com-
parative method, nation-states are often the main unit of
analysis. Yet the study of SAcc requires more nuanced
approaches that can address their inherent uneven-ness within
states and societies. In practice, any large-scale change
initiative is likely to unfold in diverse ways across districts,
provinces, and sectors. Empirically, the subnational compara-
tive method can reveal patterns of variation that otherwise
would be hidden by homogenizing national averages. Analyti-
cally, this approach allows researchers to hold many key
contextual factors constant, which can help to highlight the
impacts of speciﬁc institutional change strategies (Snyder,
2001).6. CONCLUSIONS
This study reconsidered the empirical evidence through new
conceptual lenses, in order to transcend the impasse associated
with the notion of “mixed results” and to inform more strate-
gic approaches to social accountability. The main elements of
the argument include:
First, the SAcc umbrella of diverse citizen-state engagement
interfaces involves two qualitatively distinct sets of
approaches: tactical and strategic. The impact evaluation evi-
dence indicates that while the tactical approach has led to
mixed results, strategic approaches are more promising. Tacti-
cal approaches are bounded, localized, and information-led –yet information alone often turns out to be insuﬃcient. More
innovation, experimentation and comparative analysis will
help to determine what kinds of information are most action-
able for pro-accountability stakeholders, as well as the chan-
nels for dissemination that can motivate collective action,
empower allies and weaken vested interests.
Strategic approaches to SAcc, in contrast, bolster enabling
environments for collective action, scale up citizen engagement
beyond the local arena and attempt to bolster governmental
capacity to respond to voice. So far, however, both SAcc
advocates and skeptics have tended to assume that citizen
voice, by itself, is supposed to be able to do the work of the
state’s own horizontal accountability institutions. Yet few
voice-led initiatives are well-coordinated with relevant public
sector reforms that encourage responsiveness (i.e., audit/
anti-corruption investigative bodies, information access
reforms, grievance redress mechanisms, ombudsman agencies,
access to courts, etc.). At the same time, ICT-led SAcc initia-
tives are increasingly framed in terms of “closing the feedback
loop” – in other words, getting institutions to listen to citizen
voice (Gigler & Baijur, 2014). Yet institutional response
capacity often remains elusive; in practice feedback loops
rarely close.
Second, now that the SAcc ﬁeld has generated a substantial
body of practice, this is a timely moment to take stock.
Research lags signiﬁcantly behind practice, and theoretical
and conceptual work lags even further behind research. In
response, this study concludes with a series of grounded con-
ceptual propositions intended to inform higher impact SAcc
strategies – with an emphasis on the potential synergy between
“voice” and “teeth” – with the latter deﬁned as governmental
capacity to respond to voice.
Third, both practical and analytical work on SAcc needs to
take scale into account. When voice spreads horizontally, the
excluded can gain representation. When voice is projected ver-
tically, it can gain clout. When authorities listen, they can both
build trust and create incentives for more voice. Yet this pro-
cess is easier said than done, and the dynamics that drive it will
not be well-understood if mainstream development agencies
continue to treat state failures as a strictly local, “end-of-
the-pipe” problem. 28 This underscores the relevance of com-
bining vertical integration with the horizontal spread of civil
society oversight and advocacy capacity. This combination
of scaling up with “scaling across” can make possible the
combination of voice with representation that is crucial for
signiﬁcantly changing the terms of engagement between
excluded citizens and the state.
What does this emphasis on scale have to do with the vast
and growing on-going array of SAcc initiatives around the
world? At the local level, many small-scale pilots may be ready
for more scaling up and horizontal expansion – though only
ﬁne-grained contextual analysis can determine which ones,
when and how. Already-existing large-scale governmental
SAcc reforms need more support from other governance
reforms in order to both broaden and deepen the openings
they have created – for example, in the cases of India’s social
audits in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program
and the community participation in Indonesia’s PNPM rural
development program. Both innovative reform initiatives
potentially reach tens of millions of people, both build in
openings for voice for the poorest – yet state capacity to
respond remains limited, uneven and contested, and grassroots
stakeholders have yet to scale up their monitoring capacity
and gain a seat at the table.
To sum up, the challenge facing social accountability strate-
gies is how to break low-accountability traps by triggering vir-
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zens to exercise voice, which in turn can trigger and empowerreforms, which can then encourage more voice. That is, voice
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